A number of our readers have contacted us regarding access to the source material we used for our upcoming series on the Harris County District Attorney’s office, “Corruption on Steroids”.  After some discussion, we decided that the best way to handle the majority of the requests was to post a number of examples of our research methodology and field any other specific questions.  Our readers that still need access to the entire volume of our source material can still make an appointment to come by the office.

Base Research Example:

The subject of our first example is Sean Tyrone Johnson.  We first received a tip about these records from a contact that we developed over a couple of years.  Since the County records are indexed under SPN numbers and the State records are indexed under SID numbers, the first thing we did was pull all the records referenced by those numbers.  This is a subset of those records that can give you a good idea of how we start the process.  Here’s an example of the research summary sheet.  You’ll need to reference the summary sheet as we walk through the records.  Finally, you might want to print out a copy of Mr. Johnson’s criminal history to reference as well.

If you look at the upper right corner of the summary sheet, you’ll notice a field called “Fraud Flags”.  Different than simply clerical errors, “Fraud Flags” are an indicator of the number of items in the subject record that may have been criminally tampered with when weighted against other evidence in the record, conflicts with DPS records, conflicting or impossible date information and compliance with Chapter 60 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates particular actions on the part of the arresting agent, prosecutor and court.

The next section lists the different names that are associated with the subject’s SPN.  These are not simply aliases, but a deliberate obfuscation of an individual.  You only need to look at the first two entries where the first is a young black man and the second a white male five years his senior.  More on this later.

The next section lists the complaining witnesses.  An enormous effort is made to track down each witness and verify with them “real time” if they were, in fact, a complainant in the particular criminal matter.

The next section images every signature specimen from the subject in the record so that they can be compared.  The same holds true for the final section which images every judicial signature in the subject records for comparison.

This particular subject record is interesting for the dates of arrest and conviction.  It would have been impossible for many of the arrests to have occurred as Mr. Johnson was still in jail from the previous arrests.  If you calendar plot each of the offenses from arrest to conviction, only about three of arrests could have actually occurred.

We’ll get back to Mr. Johnson after we’ve had a chance to analyze a few more subject records.   Make sure you check back over the next couple of days.  We’ll be posting a couple of subject records which involved pushing deliberately falsified records up to DPS and NCIC under Rachel Palmer’s direction.

Research Outside the Record:

Samuel M. Skipper is the subject of this example.  Mr. Skipper apparently leads a charmed life in that he has managed to chalk up at least 4 DWI’s while at the same time somehow managing to have the First Court of Appeals enter final disposition findings of “non-adjudication of guilt” on at least 6 other charges.

One of the main issues researchers of these kinds of constructed and fraudulent records has do deal with is the very absence of the records themselves.   This obviously comes at no great surprise as covering the trail of criminal tampering would be pretty important for the folks committing those crimes.  That requires the researcher to go outside of the records to public databases that buy their data from the Texas CJIS system through Austin.  It is EmPac Texas policy that data collected from public databases must be verified from another independent source before being cited in articles appearing on our site.

Let’s start out with what we can find in the record, Skipper’s latest charge of Impersonating a Public Servant - a Texas Ranger to be more exact.  On first examination of the county records we notice that there is no information ever filed in this matter and the indictment was filed on July 14th, 2011.   We also took note that the file date stamp on the complaint is a hand stamp.  Taken by themselves, odd but not significant.  Things become interesting when we take a closer look at the indictment.  We note that there is no “Book” and “Page” number for us to cross reference.  However, the most telling item to note is the signature of the Grand Jury Foreman. What you are seeing is a flipped mirror image of a signature.  Thus we conclude that this is a fabricated document created specifically to simulate a legal process, the end result of which was to have the matter dismissed.

The rest of Skipper’s Harris County criminal history is void of documents.  It was when we turned to the public databases that we discovered DWI’s which appear to have never been disclosed to the three Harris County courts in which Skipper appeared allowing him to appear as a 1st time offender.  This becomes significant once you understand how repeat offenders are identified.  After arrest, you are electronically finger-printed on an AFIS system which immediately checks to see if you have ever been arrested before.  If you have been, your unique SID number is sent back to the booking staff along with your identifying information.  If not, you are assigned a new SID number.

You are left with assuming that the previous arrest information was obscured.  Dig a little deeper and you find six (6) very strange final disposition findings of “non-adjudication of guilt” from the First Court of Appeals.  There are a great deal more issues at play in Skipper’s records that we detail in our upcoming series about the Harris County DA’s office, “Corruption on Steroids”.  For our purposes here, this covers the basics of our public record methodology.

Hunting down tampering with DPS Records:

For this example we’ll be turning to the DPS records, or lack thereof, for one Ruben E. Diaz.  While this one actually contains relatively few records, its implications are staggering.  But before we move on, we need to understand a bit more about the Texas CJIS system.

In 1989, the Legislature mandated enhancements to the Texas CJIS system.  These enhancements included the use of an incident tracking number (“TRN”).  The TRN is a unique number assigned to a specific person during a specific arrest and along with the State Identification Number (“SID”) provides for tracking the arrest, custody status, court disposition and sentence resulting from each offense.  For our purposes in this example, the SID number is what we’ll be focusing on.  It is important to understand that only DPS can assign a SID and SID’s are only assigned to a single identifying set of fingerprints which uniquely identify an individual.  Because you only have one set of fingerprints, you can only be assigned one SID.  To bring it full circle, if you have a SID, its because DPS has your fingerprints.

Here’s how it works.  When you are arrested, you are fingerprinted on AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System).  The AFIS system immediately transmits your fingerprints to DPS in Austin where they are checked against every other set of prints on record.  If no match is found, a new SID is created for you.  If a match is found, your existing SID is retrieved and transmitted back to the booking staff along with your complete criminal history.  In either case, the entire process take only a few minutes.

Turning back to our example, let’s look at a few simple documents.  Based on the criminal history on page one, we don’t have to look at any other documents to know that Mr. Diaz has been arrested more than once.  Thus, we know that he must necessarily have been assigned a SID number.   If we look at page two, we can verify that Mr. Diaz was indeed assigned a SID and that indeed, his SID is consistent as he moved from conviction to conviction.    In this case, PublicData.com gives us his SID number of 07837256.   Remember that PublicData.com acquires their data from DPS.  The very fact that Diaz has the same SID for each of his convictions confirms for us that after initially being assigned a SID following his first arrest, when he was printed for each successive arrest, DPS matched the prints to an existing record and sent his existing SID back to the booking officer.  So far, so good.

Its when you get to page three that everything falls apart.  Page three is a copy of one of Mr. Diaz’s arrest records as it currently exists with DPS.  The DPS information tells us that this record is for the arrest and prosecution in cause number 1099487.  We can verify on page one that Diaz was convicted in this cause number and from page two that his SID was part of the record when he was sentenced.  However, the DPS record on page three does not list a SID.  Further, if we read the top of the page we can see that there are also no fingerprints associated with this record.

We already know from what we’ve learned that this is impossible.   In fact, according to the various users manuals available in the resource section of our site which include the DA’s intake procedures, the DA’s operating manual and the operating and users guides for the Texas CJIS system,  it is impossible to even file charges until an individual is printed and assigned a new SID or matched with an existing SID.  In fact, based on the existence of a TRN in the DPS record, we can conclude with a good degree of certainty that someone has criminally tampered with the DPS record we see on page three.

Our conclusion is elevated to an absolute certainty after examining Mr. Diaz’s remaining DPS records and finding that they too no longer have his assigned SID or corresponding fingerprints.

What you are seeing on page three is the result of someone deliberately tampering with the very criminal records that Texas and Federal authorities rely on to keep us safe.  By separating the fingerprints from the arrest records, there is no way to verify whether or not an individual has a dangerous criminal history, should be allowed to buy guns, should be required to register as a pedophile instead of teaching or working with children, is known to be criminally violent or is now able to pass any number of background tests required to obtain any number of professional licenses in the State of Texas.  In effect, someone has granted Mr. Diaz a free pass.

That this type of alteration is possible and can occur without the knowledge of the convicting court, the arresting agency or even worse, the crime victims themselves, is alarming.  The idea that violent criminals, through payment or political favor, can have their records effectively expunged through this type of tampering is disturbing.  Given that DPS pushes records up to the FBI’s NCIC system, the implications that this type of criminal behavior has on the the Justice Department’s ability to administer the federal system of criminal justice is alarming.

Given the availability of the audit information which logs every action and keystroke of individuals logged on to the Texas CJIS system, identifying the source of the criminal tampering is an academic task and someone needs to be brought to answer.  Because a number of federal agencies such as the US Marshals and Homeland Security rely on these records to secure our boarders and airways, the parties responsible for this tampering should be made to answer under the Patriot Act.

Part one of the series, “Secret Justice”, picks up with the fabricated records that populate the Harris County public records.  Over the last three years, Empac Texas met with two separate staff members from document imaging; those Harris County employees with the responsibility of imaging the criminal and civil court records which in effect comprise the public record.  In candid conversations, Empac Texas was educated in how court records are changed and altered on a routine basis by clerks and court staff.

The ease with which staff members related these actions was disturbing, seemingly unaware of the seriousness of the felonies committed.  However, they did not act alone.  In fact, these staff members don’t even have a dog in this fight – they act under instructions by others who do. Letters and documents obtained from the DA’s office leave little question that Harris County ADA’s and defense counsel are criminally tampering with court documents; officers of the court committing fraud on the court. 

In the following example, you can clearly see where a probable cause affidavit has been scotch-taped to a complaint and the signatures then scotch-taped to the bottom before being imaged. This is a well practiced and disturbing behavior.

This tampering extends to criminal history data stored in the State’s Criminal Justice Information System  (“CJIS”) and the FBI’s NCIC systems, affecting the administration of the federal system of justice.    Empac Texas obtained a statement from the  General Counsel’s Office for the District Attorney who, while acknowledging the tampering, did not feel that “there was anything criminal to investigate in regards to any additions/changes to the state of the record[s].”

Part two of “Secret Justice” will make you think twice about court-appointed attorneys.  Empac Texas has uncovered three local attorneys who have collected over $5 million in fees from court appointments over the last ten years, most of them from the same four courts.   That’s over 10,000 court-appointed cases.   Sounds impossible, and it is.  We did the math.  When you add up all the cases and all the other court appointments, there just are not that many cases to go around.  There are literally more court appointed cases then there were cases to appoint.  To pull that off, you need cooperative Assistant District Attorneys (“ADA’s”) and court staff.

Empac Texas uncovered an industry of fraud costing the tax payers millions at the expense of those the attorneys were appointed to represent.   Additionally, our research demonstrates an avalanche of fraudulent court records, altered court documents, forged judicial signatures, fabricated charges, defendants who were either deceased or outright fictions and fraudulent grand jury indictments, none of which would be possible without the assistance and participation of the DA’s office, court clerks and/or Harris County Clerk staff members.

Part three of “Secret Justice” uncovers the DA’s practice of stacking charges onto convictions without the knowledge of the Defendant or the court.  We’ll also expose how convictions are altered after final judgment, often eliminating jail time from the sentence ordered by the Court.  In effect, defense counsel and an ADA conspire together to broker a deal that is implemented without regard for the findings of the court.  Empac Texas has uncovered how a number of local defense firms are working with the DA’s office expunging records outside of any court proceeding and forever erasing not only their client’s convictions but the efforts of the DA and the firm at the same time.   Empac Texas has been documenting and  tracking these expungments and the attorneys who filed them for the last two years.

Watch for Part one of “Secret Justice” by Empac Texas to be released in the next few weeks.

Delivered to:
Mayor Annise D. Parker
City of Houston

Charles A. MCClelland, Jr.
Chief of Police

Note Regarding Exhibits

All of the exhibits referenced in this report can be immediately accessed by simply clicking on the linked text throughout the body of the document.  This not only makes the document easier to read but also allows the reader to forward the main document though email without concerns regarding the file size or location.  Additionally, the author is able to insure the integrity of the original files while still making them available to any number of simultaneous users.

SUMMARY

After filing a sworn statement in support of a complaint with the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) of the Houston Police Department (“HPD”), Richard C. Hesseldahl, the subject of the complaint, began a campaign of retribution against the complainant.  Officer Hesseldahl acted both individually and in concert with other parties to deprive the complainant of certain secured rights under the color of law, to make false and fictitious claims, to file fraudulent police reports, to obstruct court orders, to suborn perjury, to seize property and to aid in the theft of property.

Officer Hesseldahl falsely pretended to be an employee of the U.S. Secret Service and used this pretended character¹ The main contact telephone number is the Secret Service switchboard in Houston, TX, the second contact number is a private cell number and the fax number noted is a private fax number.  Officer Hesseldahl was a member of the Houston Area Task Force as an HPD officer.  This card deliberately obscures that he is an HPD officer and demonstrates intent to act with the authority of a pretended character.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 912] in order to obtain papers and documents of value.² Further, Officer Hesseldahl abused the grand jury subpoena process in Harris County, Texas, reserved for grand jury investigations, by issuing subpoenas in the furtherance of his own pretended U.S. Secret Service investigation transforming a court process into a function of his own.

The complainant, Gregory Montelaro (“Montelaro”) was engaged in a complex and heated civil battle over title to a residential property when he first encountered Officer Hesseldahl.  Officer Hesseldahl interfered with and deliberately obstructed the civil suit by assisting in an illegal eviction of Montelaro and taking Montelaro into custody to prevent any interference.  Acting with other officers and private parties – without a writ or warrant of any kind, Officer Hesseldahl seized Montelaro’s home, vehicles, possessions, papers and effects and initiated and maintained criminal actions against Montelaro the sole purpose of which was the deprivation of Montelaro’s Fourth Amendment Rights.³ Montelaro was instructed to file a complaint with IAD and was assured that by doing so he would not be made the target of retribution by Officer Hesseldahl.

This document details criminal allegations specific to the actions of Officer Hesseldahl before and after Montelaro filed the IAD complaint.  Officer Hesseldahl targeted Montelaro for retribution despite HPD’s assurances to the contrary and he and others continue their actions against Montelaro to date.  Officer Hesseldahl appears to be above having to answer for his actions and Montelaro does not wish to engender any further acts of retribution by filing another IAD complaint.⁴ Instead, Montelaro submits this document to Officer Hesseldahl’s chain of command alleging a number of crimes committed by Officer Hesseldahl, attaches evidence supporting each allegation and relies on their duty as officers to prohibit further retribution.

BACKGROUND⁵

On or about September 28, 2001, Montelaro’s partner purchased a home and financed the purchase through Memorial Park Mortgage Ltd. (“Memorial Park Mortgage”), a local mortgage bank.  Montelaro’s partner signed a promissory note in the amount of $262,650.00 (the “Note”) in favor of Memorial Park Mortgage. (Exhibit “2”)  Memorial Park Mortgage immediately infected the chain of title, and the clarity of the security and legal interests in the property, as a direct result of selling fraudulently created documents to multiple investors and banks representing each set of documents as the original loan and warranting to each investor a transfer of all rights, title and interests of Memorial Park Mortgage in the original loan. (Exhibit “3”)  In effect they sold the same loan to multiple parties as part of a mortgage fraud scheme.

Discovery in the civil matter would eventually demonstrate that Memorial Park Mortgage first sold the loan to Freddie Mac under an Irrevocable Power of Attorney⁶ in which they forever conveyed all rights, titles and interests in the loan and through which Freddie Mac took delivery of the Loan on or about October 9, 2001. (Exhibit “5”)  As such, the sale of the loan by Memorial Park Mortgage and any other documents of transfer filed after this date in the county records claiming ownership through assignment by Memorial Park Mortgage are fraudulent as Memorial Park Mortgage no longer had any rights or interest in the loan.⁷

In November of 2003, Montelaro’s partner, working with Freddie Mac, agreed to modify the terms of the original loan.  Freddie Mac instructed Montelaro and his partner to go to the law offices of Barrett Burke in Houston, Texas, to sign the final documents.  There Montelaro’s partner was fraudulently induced into signing a loan modification naming Principal Residential (Exhibit “6”) and not Freddie Mac as the owner of the loan.⁸

Montelaro and his partner are domestic partners and had agreed that although title was taken in his partner’s name for credit and convenience purposes only, the home would be enjoyed jointly as tenants in common,⁹ which included the right of either to subdivide the property.  In order to recognize the money, labor and materials Montelaro had contributed and recognizing that Texas affords no property protection for domestic partnerships, Montelaro and his partner agreed to execute a mechanic’s lien as the vehicle best suited to protect Montelaro’s interests.  In strict compliance with the requisites of mechanic’s liens under Texas Property Code, Montelaro filed an affidavit in the Real Property Records establishing an inception date of 2002.

When Principal Residential fraudulently and materially altered the loan modification agreement in 2003 changing the mortgagee from Freddie Mac to Principal Residential, they created a subordinating event as it related to Montelaro’s mechanic’s lien that had not before existed.  As a direct result of their fraud, the mechanic’s lien took priority over the Principal Residential Loan Modification Agreement under the Relation Back Doctrine.¹⁰

In July of 2004, Principal Residential sent notice of foreclosure and appointed a substitute trustee.  On October 5, 2004, Principal Residential foreclosed the fraudulent loan and filed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed into the Harris County Real Property Records identifying Freddie Mac as the buyer.  (Exhibit “8”)

Montelaro’s partner filed suit in the 189th District Court of Harris County, Texas, through which Freddie Mac requested and was eventually denied possession of the property in final judgment.¹¹his Judgment finally disposes…of all claims.”  The summary judgment motion did not request possession of the property as part of the relief.  As a matter of law, any relief not granted by Final Judgment is specifically denied. ] Freddie Mac then twice improperly petitioned justice court for possession of the Montelaro’s home without disclosing the District Court’s previous denial of possession in final judgment.¹² The fraudulent conveyance rules permit a defrauded creditor to ignore the subordinating transfer and realize recovery against the assets surreptitiously squandered.¹³ Accordingly Montelaro regained possession of the property and moved back in during September of 2006.

COMPLAINT

On October 5, 2006, Shadrick Bogany (“Bogany”) pretending to act as a real estate agent for Freddie Mac arrived at the Montelaro’s home and demanded that Montelaro vacate the property.  Montelaro called the police who on arrival instructed Bogany to leave the property.  Bogany was also instructed to leave the property by the Harris County Constables office.

The following day, after Montelaro left for work, Bogany filed a sham affidavit of trespass acting on Officer Hesseldahl’s instructions and returned to the property accompanied by HPD patrol officers who allowed Bogany to break into and take possession of Montelaro’s home. (Exhibit “9”)  Several patrol officers stood by and watched Bogany remove great deal of Montelaro’s personal property, business inventory, Mercedes 560SL parked in a locked garage and moving truck parked in the driveway.  None of this property has been recovered.  Montelaro called the police and was instructed to contact Financial Crimes and informed that if he attempted to return to his home or interfere with the officers currently at the address he would be arrested.

Montelaro’s attorney advised him not to return to the property before securing a bond granting him immediate possession.  Despite securing such a bond, Montelaro was arrested while sleeping in his home on the morning of October 20, 2006, based on Bogany’s sham affidavit of trespass.

On October 27, 2006, based in part on the preceding summary and exhibits, all charges against Montelaro were dismissed on his first court appearance on which the Court specifically noted that Montelaro “was the owner of the property.” (Exhibit “10”)  Six days later Montelaro was again arrested by Officer Hesseldahl on November 2, 2006 based on Bogany’s sham affidavit of trespass.

During both arrests, Montelaro had property and papers seized by the arresting officers.  Officer Hesseldahl acted to hold over the seized property until June of this year when Montelaro procured an order from County Court 8 for the complete release of his property followed by obtaining a release from the HPD Burglary and Theft Division.  However, the property room staff no longer had custody of Montelaro’s personal property and instead produced a box containing approximately 5000 original certified copies of documents from Harris County produced in response to two Grand Jury subpoenas issued by Officer Hesseldahl. (Exhibit “11”)   Also contained in the box were several letters with accompanying document CDs from law firms responding to these Grand Jury subpoenas, several hundred various additional documents which appear to correlate to the large number “case” or “research” notes from Officer Hesseldahl.  Finally, contained in the box were the non-public incident reports referenced in this complaint.  The custody receipt issued by the property room identifies the box of documents and a separate CD containing documents as those items released to Montelaro. (Exhibit “12”)  Officer Hesseldahl continued to add these items to Montelaro’s property box through April 30th of this year.  A property room supervisor stated that all of Montelaro’s property had been released to “the division”.

The crimes reported by this document are based in large part on the documents handed over to Montelaro by the property room on June 24, 2010.  On information and belief, the police reports referenced herein have all been tampered with and include fabricated statements entered after the reporting officers entered their reports.

The October 6, 2006 report was entered by Officer Lindquist. (Exhibit “13”)  The narrative section of report 154308606-S falsely states that Montelaro’s home is vacant and deliberately avoids referencing reports from the previous day which would demonstrate Montelaro’s occupancy of the property.  Contrary to the report, Bogany is not the field representative for Freddie Mac nor is he employed by Freddie Mac.  In fact, according to documentation produced by Bogany in the civil matter and by the Houston Association of Realtors, Bogany’s contractual relationship with Freddie Mac to act as a real estate agent, if there ever was one for this property, did not commence until sometime after October 18, 2006.  (Exhibit “14”)

In effect, Officer Linquist’s report states that she was called out to the address at 11:55 on 10/06/06 on a trespass call.  The officer arrives at Montelaro’s home to find the property secured with vehicles registered to that address parked in the garage and driveway.  She then allows a man she has never met without any documentation to demonstrate either his residence or his representation, to break into the property and take possession of Montelaro’s home based only on his story that Officer Lindquist then enters verbatim in her report without any attempts to verify.  She then dates her report for the previous day, 10/05/2006, and submits it.

On the advice of counsel, Montelaro obtained a bond granting him immediate possession of the property.  Despite securing such a bond, Montelaro was arrested while sleeping in his home on the morning of October 20, 2006, based on Bogany’s affidavit of trespass.

Officer Lindquist was the arresting officer on October 20, 2006.  The copy of the public incident report 162083106-X, certified on 06/05/2007, demonstrates that the non-public report of the same designation was tampered with (Exhibit “15”) sometime after 06/05/2007.  The non-public report includes a third “Article” not part of the report on 06/05/07 described as “[miscellaneous] documents, some of which may constitute forgery or fraud, which the [suspect] provided to the [officers] regarding the property on Knox”.  The report falsely states that documents were tagged in the property room under the incident number.   The non-public report also contains a witness not in the original report including a false driver’s license number for the witness.

As with her report of 10/06/06, the entirety of Officer Linquist’s narrative is fabricated and charges Montelaro for a window broken by an HPD officer the previous evening.  Officer Linquist reached into the broken window, unlocked the door, entered the property and arrested Montelaro while he was sleeping.  On information and belief, Exhibit “16” demonstrates the ruse employed by Officer Hesseldahl on 10/23/06 to take over the investigation.

On October 27, 2006, based in part on the preceding summary and exhibits, all charges against Montelaro were dismissed on his first court appearance on which the Court specifically noted that Montelaro “was the owner of the property.”¹⁴

On November 2, 2006, responding to a call from a neighbor, Montelaro arrived home to find two patrol cars parked in front of his home and Bogany in his driveway.  Bogany immediately told the patrol officers that the U.S. Secret Service was in route and gave them a telephone number to call. (Exhibit “17” at page 2,  paragraph 2)  Several minutes later, Officer Hesseldahl arrived with Srgt. Gorski in the same vehicle stating to the patrol officers that Srgt. Gorski was acting as the on-site supervisor.[15. Exhibit “18” – In his report, Officer Hesseldahl deliberately obscures the fact that he and Srgt. Gorski arrived together in Officer Hesseldahl’s truck. Montelaro’s request for another supervisor was ignored. ]

On information and belief, Officer Hesseldahl’s report was altered after being filed.  On its face, the entirety of the narrative section is a complete fabrication.

On arrival, Officer Hesseldahl placed Montelaro in hand-cuffs, seized Montelaro’s wallet, lighter, money, mail and keys with which he let himself and Bogany into Montelaro’s home.  After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Officer Hesseldahl came back out to the street with several folders seized from Montelaro’s home and instructed one of the patrol officers to place Montelaro in the back of the patrol car.

At the time, Montelaro had on his person (1) a dismissal order from County Court 8 with a note from the judge stating that Montelaro “was the owner of the property,” (2) a bond granting Montelaro immediate possession of the property, (3) a writ of possession, a copy of which was left on the front door of Montelaro’s home by the constable and (4) a copy of the Final Judgment from the 189th District Court denying Freddie Mac possession of the property.

Officer Hesseldahl’s Incident Report # 169628406-Y states that the property was vacant. Id. at page 2.004 However, this same report notes the removal of property from Montelaro’s home obviating Officer Hesseldahl’s attempt to portray Montelaro’s home as vacant.  Montelaro watched Officer Hesseldahl and Bogany remove a number of items from his home but was never presented with an inventory. [16. The HPD property room records released to Montelaro demonstrate that at one time they had custody of some of this property without indexing the specific property items. ]  Montelaro asked one of the patrol officers why he had been arrested and he was told by the officer that he had no idea what was going on.

After approximately an hour, two of the patrol officers got in the patrol car and drove Montelaro away from his house and directly to the U.S. Secret Service offices at 602 Sawyer, Houston, Texas.  (Exhibit “18” at page 2.005)   After waiting in the patrol car for approximately 30 minutes, Montelaro asked one of the patrol officers what they were doing here and again one of the patrol officers stated that he had no idea and that they had never been here before.

Moments later Officer Hesseldahl and Srgt. Gorski arrived.   Officer Hesseldahl opened the door of the patrol car and had one of the patrol officers place shackles on Montelaro’s ankles after which he dismissed the patrol officers and proceeded to escort Montelaro into the building and into an elevator.  When the elevator opened to the Secret Service offices on the 6th floor, a woman standing in the elevator lobby curtly advised Officer Hesseldahl that the offices were closed.  Officer Hesseldahl stated that he was a task force member and was waiting for other agents to arrive.

Montelaro was shackled to a table in a small room and was made to wait for an indeterminate amount of time.  Officer Hesseldahl and Srgt. Gorski eventually came in and Officer Hesseldahl introduced himself for the first time as part of the Secret Service team that had been investigating Montelaro’s fraudulent activity.  Montelaro asked why he had been arrested to which Officer Hesseldahl responded that it all depended on how well Montelaro cooperated.  Montelaro then requested to speak with his attorney after which both officers left the room.

Officer Hesseldahl returned with a nine-page document which he wanted Montelaro to sign stating that this would be the last time for Montelaro to tell his side of the story.  When Montelaro asked to read the document Officer Hesseldahl refused.  Montelaro stated he would not sign anything without being able to read it and again asked for his attorney.

Over the next five and a half hours Montelaro was physically and mentally intimidated by Officer Hesseldahl in his efforts to get Montelaro to sign the statement.  At one point, when Officer Hesseldahl and Srgt. Gorski were both in the room, Montelaro asked why it was so important for Officer Hesseldahl to create fraud out of Montelaro’s actions where none existed when the original mortgage company had committed enough real mortgage fraud to keep the Secret Service busy for years.  Officer Hesseldahl tossed Montelaro one of the folders seized from Montelaro’s home and instructed Montelaro to show him the fraud.

Montelaro walked through the documents in the file demonstrating simultaneous multiple sales and assignments of the loan for he and his partner’s home to different banks.  Montelaro also demonstrated to Officer Hesseldahl where the 189th District Court had denied Freddie Mac possession of the property in final judgment.   Montelaro further explained that the two evictions that Officer Hasseldahl and Bogany were relying on as proof that Montelaro should not be on the property had been procured in Justice Court after the district court’s final judgment.  Accordingly both eviction matters were void as a matter of law as the Justice Court was without subject matter jurisdiction.[17. The Justice Court’s judgment, improperly procured by Freddie Mac, was not final and permitting such an action would allow an impermissible collateral attack on the 189th District Court’s Final Judgment.  Because the justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter of possession specific to Montelaro’s home, its judgment in the two eviction matters, relied on by Officer Hesseldahl to justify his arrest of Montelaro and his seizure of Montelaro’s property, was void as a matter of law and it was wholly unnecessary to appeal that void judgment.  Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000), see also Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 802-03 (Tex. App.–Houston {1st Dist.} 2007, no pet.). ]

Officer Hasseldahl stormed out of the room without comment.  Srgt. Gorski took a deep breath and told Montelaro that it looked like he was going to have a really long battle on his hands and that he did not envy his position.  When Srgt. Gorski got up to leave the room Montelaro once again requested to speak with his attorney.

The interview detailed in Officer Hasseldahl’s report never occurred and no recording exists to verify the interview. (Exhibit “18” at page 2.005, 2.006) Additionally, Officer Hasseldahl goes to great lengths in attempting to criminalize his discovery a stereo receiver in Montelaro’s home. (Id. at page 2.007) Montelaro accepted delivery of a box for his former neighbor from the carrier at the carrier’s request.  Officer Hesseldahl opened a box addressed to someone else in order to discover and seize the receiver inside.  Officer Hesseldahl notes in his report that he required Montelaro’s neighbor to come to the Secret Service office at 602 Sawyer to pick the receiver up however without a schedule filed on the seized property or any evidence that the receiver was tagged to the property room, there is no way to prove what happened to the receiver or any of the property Officer Hesseldahl and Bogany removed from Montelaro’s home.  (Id. at page 2.009)

Officer Hesseldahl’s actions with the stereo receiver demonstrate his pattern of obstruction of court processes and his complete disregard for state laws.¹⁵ Officer Hesseldahl never presented Montelaro with a list of property seized from his home and after forcefully removing Montelaro from his home in custody; he simply handed over Montelaro’s keys to Bogany.  Montelaro’s vehicles, personal property, business inventory, papers and effects have never been recovered.

For nearly six hours Officer Hesseldahl kept Montelaro secreted at the offices of the U.S. Secret Service in athird-degree effort to have Montelaro sign a nine-page typed statement that Montelaro was not allowed to read.  Montelaro’s requests that he be allowed to call his attorney were ignored and when he was finally brought to the city jail he was still not charged with a crime until the following day.  Officer Hesseldahl charged Montelaro with criminal trespass with Bogany acting as the complainant and fraudulently claiming Bogany owned Montelaro’s home.  This charge was identical to the charge that had been dismissed only days earlier. (Exhibit “19”) (See also Exhibit “10”)

In his HPD incident report, Officer Hesseldahl states that Montelaro has “fraudulently filed numerous documents with the Harris County Clerk’s office” yet he never demonstrates a single fraudulent document.[19. Exhibit “18” at page 2.004 – Officer Hesseldahl uses this claim and his claim that Montelaro is the target of an ongoing Secret Service investigation as a means by which he obstructs law enforcement and court orders throughout this matter. ]  Officer Hesseldahl deliberately misstates material facts by stating that when Montelaro was arrested he had nothing more than a “fraudulently filed” eviction notice naming him as owner of the property.  (Id. at page 2.005 – Evictions are processes of possession not title.)  At the time of his arrest, Montelaro had on his person (1) a dismissal order from County Court 8 with a note from the judge stating that Montelaro “was the owner of the property,” (2) a bond granting Montelaro immediate possession of the property, (3) a writ of possession, a copy of which was left on the front door of Montelaro’s home by the constable and (4) a copy of the Final Judgment from the 189th District Court denying Freddie Mac possession of the property.

Officer Hesseldahl falsely pretended to be an employee of the U.S. Secret Service in order to obtain papers and documents of value.[20. 18 USC § 912 ] Additionally, Officer Hesseldahl used this pretended character in concert with other parties to deprive Montelaro of certain secured rights under the color of law, to make false and fictitious claims, to obstruct court orders, to suborn perjury, to obstruct local law enforcement, to seize property and to aid in the theft of property.

Officer Hesseldahl and Bogany acted in concert to seize the following property from Montelaro and his partner; a Mercedes 560SL, a Ford F-Superduty moving box truck with lift gate, personal and business property – none of which have been recovered.¹⁶ Neither Officer Hesseldahl nor Bogany has produced a writ or warrant of any kind.  Officer Hesseldahl and Bogany are not entitled to Montelaro’s personal property and vehicles and have exercised unlawful dominion and control over property that does not belong to them.  Their conduct evidences a clear repudiation of Montelaro’s rights.

Officer Hesseldahl conspired with Bogany have Montelaro removed from his home by force and then maintained criminal charges against Montelaro thereby allowing Bogany to list Montelaro’s home for sale.    On December 12, 2006, Bogany improperly filed a suit on behalf of Freddie Mac in the 151st District Court under “Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order” in which Bogany signed a sham affidavit of authority. (Exhibit “20”)  Bogany is not an officer of Freddie Mac and no authorization or limited power of attorney exists to allow him to act as attorney-in-fact and file suit on behalf of Freddie Mac.  There is no record of such authority on file with Harris County and Freddie Mac has no corporate record of ever having granted such authority.  For Bogany, all of these acts, without exception, are specifically prohibited by the Texas Real Estate Act[22. Texas Occupations Code § 1101-654] and under the Texas Occupations Code are considered felonies.

Montelaro was placed on Deferred Adjudication following a no-contest plea for the trespass charges filed by Officer Hesseldahl.  On June 13, 2007, Freddie Mac filed a non-suit in the civil matter filed by Bogany thereby abandoning their attempt to gain title to Montelaro’s home.  With the filing of the non-suit, the criminal court terminated Montelaro’s Deferred Adjudication and dismissed the entire matter against him.  (Exhibit “21” – Of note is the Court’s amendment striking Bogany as the complainant.)

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), provides in pertinent part that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated… .”  As a result of the state action in this case, Montelaro’s home was not only seized, but it literally had all of its doors and windows covered over by sheets of steel while HPD officers who knew that Bogany did not have an eviction order and that his actions were unlawful either stood by allowing Bogany to act or actually took Montelaro into custody to prevent him from interfering.  Being dispossessed of one’s home in the manner which occurred here can not be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

A “seizure” of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 190, 113, (1984). In addition, “at the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v. James,400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).

Here, Officer Hesseldahl, acting under the color of law, physically removed Montelaro from his home and allowed Bogany to cover the doors and windows of Montelaro’s home with sheet metal, an act specifically designed destroy Montelaro’s right to retreat into his own home.  Such a heinous violation of rights is seldom seen in society.

Throughout this entire matter Officer Hesseldahl, acting under color of law, participated in the seizure of Montelaro’s property.  Officer Hesseldahl and all of the officers who stood by knowing Bogany did not have an eviction order and allowed Bogany to act unlawfully to dispossess Montelaro of his home and property, participated directly with Bogany or actually took Montelaro into custody to prevent him from interfering with Bogany have violated their qualified immunity consistent with and directly on point with Soldal v Cook County506 U.S. 56 (1992).  Officer Hesseldahl prevented Montelaro from using reasonable force to protect his home from private action he knew was illegal demonstrating sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between Bognay and Officer Hesseldahl.   See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 -161 (1970).  “The constitution’s requirements are as applicable to the police when they chose sides in a dispute among citizens as when they seize evidence for use in criminal prosecutions.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S.56 (1991); Guzell v. Hiller,223 F.3d 518 (7^th Circuit 2000).

When Montelaro contacted HPD in an effort to recover his property a supervisor in the auto-theft division of HPD told Montelaro that they had been advised by Officer Hasseldahl that Montelaro was under investigation by the HAFTF for filing fraudulent reports and he refused to take a stolen vehicle report from Montelaro.  Montelaro has made a further six attempts, the last being July 2, 2010, and is still being refused.

After County Court 15 terminated Montelaro’s Deferred Adjudication and dismissed the entire matter against him, Montelaro filed a complaint against Officer Hesseldahl with IAD in a continuing effort to recover the property seized from his home.  After filing the complaint, Officer Hesseldahl began parking in front of Montelaro’s business and residence for brief times during the day.  Montelaro contacted IAD regarding this behavior.  For several days IAD stated that they were unable to locate Montelaro’s complaint.

Montelaro also spoke with Srgt. Perret in the Command Division of HPD who suggested that Montelaro’s property may still be at the house.  Montelaro explained that the last two times he had been to the property he had been arrested and that he was uninterested in going back to the property until the civil matter was decided.  After several days of collecting information, Srgt Perret provided Montelaro with a police escort back on to the property and assured him that he would not be arrested.  Montelaro called Srgt. Perret once inside and reported that his items were not present but that other property was.  Exhibit “22” is an HPD Incident Report which details the actual events which occurred on the date that Montelaro returned to the property under police escort.[23. The responding officers were instructed to make no arrests and the District Attorney refused to accept any charges on Montelaro as a result of his being on the property on 6/20/2007. ] On information and belief, particular sections of this report have been altered after the date it was filed, specifically the first statements of Complainant #1 (“Hannah”).

Hannah’s statement that he was “unaware of any type of civil dispute in regards to the ownership of this residence” can not be supported as anything other than a fabrication.  Officer Hesseldahl was aware that Montelaro had filed a Notice of Lis Pendens in the county records on September 19, 2006.  As such, Hannah was on constructive notice of the litigation underway regarding title to the property he just purchased.  Therefore it would have been impossible for Hannah to get financing to purchase the property without conspiring with Bogany to defraud Bank of America by not disclosing the Lis Pendens.  Officer Hesseldahl was in possession of Hannah’s closing documents and was aware that Bogany and Hannah acted with intent when they hid the pending litigation from Bank of America.

Of further note is the particular attention placed on the Hannah’s efforts to access the property.  He specifically states that he “found that his front door was locked from the inside.”  He then states that the garage door and the rear door were also locked.  Hannah stated that he had to climb up to the second floor and make entry “into the residence from the kitchen.”  Once inside the residence, Hannah stated that “he heard someone coming in though the front door” and goes on to detail an assault by Montelaro which ended as he was finally able to push Montelaro out of the residence just as police arrived.

The entire altercation with Montelaro is based on Montelaro “coming through the [same] front door” that Hannah had very specifically stated was “locked from the inside.” Officer Hesseldahl’s need to alter the report with such an obvious fabrication becomes immediately clear.

Several days later, despite assurances by IAD that there would be no retribution for filing a complaint, Officer Hasseldahl created a fraudulent HPD Incident Report # 098164307-U in which he falsely states that at 13:30 hours on July 3, 2007, Montelaro and his partner “who are involved in a criminal enterprise,” (Exhibit “23” – HPD Incident Report #098164307U page 1.002) forced entry to the complainant’s residence where Montelaro then assaulted the complainant while inside the residence.  Officer Hesseldahl filed this fraudulent report and used it to have Montelaro and his partner criminally charged.  Officer Hesseldahl falsely states in his report that there is an “on-going investigation” of Montelaro by the United States Secret Service “into the organized criminal enterprise involved in the forgery of government documents, burglary of habitation and trespassing.[24. Id. at page 2.004 – Officer Hesseldahl’s statement that there is a Secret Service investigation into an on-going criminal enterprise involved in trespassing is in itself enough to demonstrate that no such investigation exists. ]  His of fabrications continue as Officer Hesseldahl states that Montelaro “plead guilty to criminal trespassing” on April 10, 2007.[25. Id. – The matter against Montelaro was dismissed on 06/13/07 without a guilty plea. ]

Pages 2.004 – 2.005 of this report makes it clear to the reader that Officer Hesseldahl was able to side-step Srgt. Perret’s prohibition regarding Montelaro’s arrest for being on the property on 6/20/2007 through his fraudulent disclosure of a Secret Service investigation into a criminal enterprise involving Montelaro when he “contacted Srgt. Perret…and advised him of the various incidents of forgery/fraud committed by the suspects.”Id. Further, by falsely claiming a forceful entry and assault though a door locked from the inside, Officer Hassaldahl is able to secure a warrant and a $20,000 bond on Montelaro for criminal trespass. Id.

On July 3, 2007, Officer Hasseldahl, Srgt. Gorski and another HAFTF member attempted to execute a pocket warrant at Montelaro’s address.  The narrative on page 2.005 of Exhibit “23” is a complete fabrication as it relates to Montelaro.¹⁷ Further, Officer Hesseldahl’s narrative details the pursuit of another suspect not even part of the 06/20/07 incident.  Officer Hesseldahl needs this individual to complete the criminal enterprise he is trying to create.  Oblivious to the criminal actions admitted to in his own words, he simply creates of an individual a new suspect.  His behavior is disturbing and more than any other action by Officer Hesseldahl in this matter, this is perhaps the most heinous.  Officer Hesseldahl details pursuing this suspect across Houston, he admits to a warrantless stop and to an unprovoked assault when he pulls him from his car to the ground and handcuffs him.  After a search of his vehicle he releases the individual.  As with Montelaro, this individual had filed an IAD complaint against Officer Hesseldahl.

The probable cause document filed in this matter is improper; it does not include a proper jurat, it has no bar number for the illegible Assistant DA signature, it contains a questionable judge’s signature and relies again on the impossibility of Montelaro entering through a door “locked from the inside.” (Exhibit “23” – last page)

On his return from Louisiana, Montelaro posted a non-arrest bond on July 12, 2007.  However, the Department of Public Safety states that Montelaro was arrested on a July 21, 2007 charge.  It is this particular issue in addition to the documents detailing this arrest fraudulently concealed from Montelaro and discovered in the documents the property room released to Montelaro on June 10, 2010, on which Montelaro intends to file a civil action.

Officer Hesseldahl creates a supplement to his fraudulent report in which he states that on July 6, 2010, he had several Grand Jury subpoenas issued, clearly oblivious to the flagrancy of his official misconduct. Id. It is an absolute abuse of the grand jury subpoena power in Texas when subpoenas are issued at the sole request of investigators.  The Texas Legislature has not chosen to vest police officers with subpoena power, and it would circumvent that legislative judgment to allow the police to make use of the grand jury process in order to do indirectly what they can not do directly.

The sole purpose of Officer Hesseldahl’s grand jury subpoenas was not an on-going United States Secret Service investigation but to further an HPD investigation into the fabricated incident report created by Hesseldahl on July 3, 2007.¹⁸ None of these documents were ever delivered to the grand jury.  Officer Hesseldahl instead went to the HPD Property Room and had all of Montelaro’s property released to his division.  He then filled the box that had contained Montelaro’s property with the original certified copies that had been produced in response to his forged subpoenas in addition to hundreds of other documents including his investigation notes as late as April 10, 2010.

The sole purpose of the grand jury subpoenas was to collect documents for his use and not to bring documents before the grand jury as part of a Secret Service investigation.  Officer Hesseldahl again succeeded in using his position as a member of the HAFTF to shield his actions from questions transforming a court process into his own function and use.  Additionally, based on the proper form of grand jury subpoenas, these subpoenas appear to be forgeries.  Further, the volume of certified documents the Harris County Clerk’s office was required to produce in response to Officer Hasseldahl’s forged subpoenas cost the Harris County tax payers over $5,000.

Not finding his property in the property room, Montelaro then went to Financial Crimes based on the property room’s chain-of-custody report stating that Montelaro’s property had been released to the division.  Montelaro met with Lt. Robert Manzo but after three weeks was told that (1) Montelaro had signed that he had received all the property listed in the motion signed by Judge Karahan; (2) that as proof of this a copy of Montelaro’s driver’s license had been taken and (3) that Lt. Manzo would not allow Montelaro to copy the documents from the property room he was relying on, he would not put his opinion in writing and he was placing the documents from the property room in the case file which he also refused to allow Montelaro to copy.  (Exhibit “24”)  Montelaro did not receive any of his property.

Lt. Manzo’s position does not account for the cash seized from Montelaro or property and documents never tagged into the property room, nor does it account for the vehicles and other personal and business property seized from Montelaro on October 6, 2006.

In December of 2008, all parties in the civil suit with any claim to title of the property, agreed to settle the issue of title among themselves.  Freddie Mac and Shadrick Bogany, the complainant with which Offer Hesseldahl worked so closely, were not part of the settlement agreement in that they had no interest in title to the property.

Through the settlement agreement, made final by the 151^st District Court in July of 2009, Montelaro and his partner were compensated for the equity lost in the property when Citimortgage, successor to Principal Residential Mortgage, wrongfully foreclosed on the property without a secured interest.  Citimortgage also agreed to settle for an amount that Montelaro and his partner felt compensated them for Citimortgage’s behavior.  Citimortgage also agreed to remove any reference to the foreclosure from Montelaro’s partner’s credit file.

Because Hannah’s claim to title was based on a fraudulent foreclosure, the title he acquired from Shadrick Bogany was not marketable.  As part of the final settlement, Montelaro and his partner agreed to deed their interests in the property to Hannah in exchange for his payment to them for the equity lost in the property.  Hannah’s attorney recorded the instrument in the Harris County property records thus clearing his title.

Montelaro and his partner were clearly victims of mortgage fraud.  The documents released to Montelaro by the property room demonstrate that Officer Hesseldahl chose to ignore the evidence of mortgage fraud and instead go to unbelievable lengths to fabricate evidence against Montelaro.

In addition to the evidence of mortgage fraud included in the introduction of this report, additional evidence of mortgage fraud committed by Memorial Park Mortgage and ignored by Officer Hesseldahl included the following:

1. Evidence that Memorial Park Mortgage used Montelaro’s partner’s Social Security Number pared with the name “Ann Dunn” to create a fictional identity through which they obtained fraudulent loans.¹⁹
2. Executed and blank assignment of Deed of Trust;
3. Executed and blank “Affidavit of Assignment Recorded in Error.”
4. Evidence demonstrating several fraudulent loans for Montelaro’s home obtained by Memorial Park Mortgage on parcels that did not exist at the time and for loan amounts greater than the purchase amount of the property.²⁰
5. Evidence that Shad Bogany’s mortgage company and Memorial Park Mortgage were owned by the same parent company.

Montelaro and his partner have a great deal more evidence supporting the criminal allegations reported herein and are willing to assist in an investigation but are unwilling to be subject to the same retribution experienced following the last IAD complaint.  None of the property or vehicles seized on October 6, 2006 and October 20, 2006 has ever been recovered even after the charges against Montelaro were dismissed on October 27, 2006.  Although Montelaro can produce titles for the vehicles free of liens, he has been prohibited from filing stolen vehicle reports as late July 2, 2010.  Officer Hesseldahl deliberately placed Montelaro’s transactions in a false light acting with the specific intent of dispossessing Montelaro of his home, property, papers and effects and, by fraudulently concealing his actions from Montelaro, oppressed Montelaro’s ability to mitigate his losses or have knowledge that claims existed.

CONCLUSION

Bogany filed a sworn statement in the civil matter stating that he was aware that Montelaro was living in his home and that he went to the police department in order to have Montelaro removed.  With Officer Hesseldahl leading the way, police officers stood by and allowed Bogany to unlawfully seize Montelaro’s home, property papers and effects.  By assisting in an illegal eviction and restraining Montelaro, the officers took “state action” that made them and the police department liable to suit.  As a result, Montelaro’s home was not only seized, it had every door and window completely sealed over with sheet metal, an act designed specifically to deprive Montelaro of his most fundamental Fourth Amendment Right to retreat into the security of his home.  “The constitution’s requirements are as applicable to the police when they chose sides in a dispute among citizens as when they seize evidence for use in criminal prosecutions.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S.56 (1991);Guzell v. Hiller, 223 F.3d 518 (7^th Circuit 2000).

When Officer Hesseldahl chose sides in Montelaro’s title dispute, he necessarily imposed his will over that of the judgment of the District Court, two county criminal courts and even the Legislature by abusing the grand jury process turning the subpoena process to his own use.  In an act of retribution he fabricated evidence, had Montelaro arrested on false charges and subverted the court in order to maintain the charges concealing exculpatory evidence in the process.

_/s// Gregory Montelaro_
Gregory J. Montelaro
1499 N Post Oak Rd.
Suite 119
Houston, TX  77055
(832) 343-0928 – phone

This document supplements the Report Regarding the Failure of Internal Affairs in Preventing Officer Retribution hand delivered on August 19, 2010.

SUPPLEMENT

Complaint Tracking  2007-29741

After signing a sworn statement in support of a complaint²¹ with Internal Affairs (“IAD”) on May 17, 2007, the Complainant (“Montelaro”) attempted to contact IAD in order to bring in additional documents in support of his complaint.  For nearly a month, Montelaro was told by Srgt. D.P. Follis²² that he should hold the documents until IAD was ready for them.  On June 14, 2007, after being told by another IAD officer that his complaint could not be found in the system, Montelaro met with Srgt. Follis in the IAD offices at 1200 Travis in an effort to discover what had happened to the complaint he had filed.  Additionally, despite dismissals from both arrests,²³ Montelaro was still being denied the ability to file a stolen vehicle report or to collect his property.   Sgt. Follis explained that Srgt. Parrett with Criminal Investigations Command had been assigned Montelaro’s IAD complaint and that he could be contacted at 713-308-1566.²⁴

Property Room

On June 19, 2007, Srgt. Parrett appears to have gone to the property room and along with one of the property room officers, opened the box containing Montelaro’s property to examine the contents.²⁵  The box released by the property room to Montelaro in June of this year contained only documents placed there by Officer Hesseldahl dated after July 6, 2007.  The documents and other property previously held had been “released to the division” by officer Hesseldahl.  Further, as demonstrated by Exhibit “27”, Officer Hesseldahl continued to access these documents through April 30th of this year.

No Authority to Act – Illegal Seizure

On or about December 14, 2006, Montelaro and his partner met for a telephone conference at the First Court of Appeals with Chief Justice Radack and Freddie Mac’s attorneys to discuss several matters regarding the pending appeal.  Freddie Mac stated that they were unaware of any criminal issues involving Montelaro’s home and believed that Montelaro and his partner were still living in the property.  Freddie Mac continued to serve Montelaro and his partner at Montelaro’s home.²⁶

Freddie Mac stated that the only document or communication authorizing Bogany to act on its behalf was a 2007 contract which specifically states that he shall act as an agent “but not attorney-in-fact” for Freddie Mac.²⁷ Accordingly, Bogany had no authority to act in any capacity for Freddie Mac in 2006.  The October 6, 2006, affidavit of trespass Officer Hesseldahl advised Bogany to fill out and file was a sham affidavit.  The seizure of property incident to the affidavit and Montelaro’s arrests demonstrate nothing more than a criminal facilitation by Officer Hesseldahl.

In May of 2009, Freddie Mac restated its position relative to the 2007 contract and when pressed regarding Montelaro’s vehicles and property removed from his home in 2006.  Freddie Mac speculated that [the vehicles and property] “may have been removed by officer(s) of the Houston Police Department incident” to Montelaro’s arrest.  Freddie Mac went on to state that they “had no involvement with or control over the removal or disposition of any personal property located on the real property at issue at any time.”²⁸

Commenting on the 2006 arrests and property seizures, Freddie Mac stated that although “records previously produced makes reference to [Bogany] ‘having a wrecker tow the car in the garage and the truck blocking the doorway to the impound lot’; neither of these actions were taken [ ] under the authorization or direction of [Freddie Mac], either expressly or impliedly” again referencing the 2007 contract. Id.

On April 30, 2008, Freddie Mac affirmatively stated that they did not act in any way to procure or instigate any detention of Montelaro. In fact, when asked to produce any communication or document authorizing Bogany to act in any capacity on their behalf from 2004 to 2008, Freddie Mac produced only a 2007 contract.

_/s// Gregory Montelaro_
Gregory J. Montelaro
1499 N Post Oak Rd.
Suite 119
Houston, TX  77055
(832) 343-0928 – phone

Both of these incidents demonstrated that acting under the color of law, the Houston Police Department fosters patterns and practices designed to remove the public’s ability to hold its officers accountable for their behavior.  There is no true citizen review or oversight of the police department and any disciplinary action taken by the department is effectively neutered by Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code through which 70% of the disciplinary actions taken against officers for misconduct is overturned or reduced.

Where public and police officials assured the citizens of Houston that what they saw on the Chad Holley video was an exception, the Trejo cover-up demonstrated that is was instead, the rule.  Contrary to assurances by the city, is has become obvious that this type of behavior is ingrained in the culture of the Houston Police Department.

The Trejo Cover Up

On April 13, 2011, HPD reported that a school bus slammed into an off-duty Houston police sergeant’s vehicle on the city’s east side. “He was in his personal vehicle, off-duty, when the school bus driver ran a stop sign and hit our officer,” said HPD spokeswoman Jodi Silva.  “Our officer was taken to Memorial Hermann with non life-threatening injuries.”  The bus driver was cited but not transported for medical care.

Sgt. Ruben Trejo’s Truck

The accident occurred at the intersection of 79th and Harrisburg but as members of the media arrived it was obvious that this was no small accident.  It was also immediately evident that contrary to HPD’s report, it was the officer that slammed into the school bus.

An HPD spokesman on the scene stated that the sergeant was on his way to work when his pickup truck hit the back of a private school bus that ran a stop sign or failed to yield the right of way.

“The preliminary information that we have is that the driver of the school bus who was headed northbound on 78th either ran the stop sign or failed to yield the right of way leaving the stop sign causing a collision with a Toyota truck that was westbound on Harrisburg being driven by an off-duty HPD sergeant,” said Capt. Robert Manzo with the HPD.

But witnesses to the accident stated that the bus did not run the stop sign.  A number of witnesses, including Teresa Argueta, the driver of the bus, stated that they saw open containers in the officer’s truck.  “He smelled drunk.  He got beer and wine open in the truck,” Argueta told members of the media.

The officers on the scene defended the sergeant, later identified as Ruben Trejo, against accusations of drunk driving.  Argueta was instead cited for failure to yield.  When Argueta and others attempted to take pictures of Trejo’s truck they witnessed officers covering the alcohol with towels and were threatened with arrest if they did not move away.  By this point a number of officers had formed a line away from the vehicle and would not allow any one to approach.

HPD Officers Form Line to keep by-standers and press from taking pictures.

Still insisting that there was no alcohol or other illegal substances involved in the accident, Capt. Robert Manzo made another statement to the press.  “We have full confidence in the fact that there would not be any substances of concern found on the sergeant.”

What we now know is that Sgt. Trejo actually had a blood alcohol level nearly three times the legal limit.  We know that he returned to work for nearly two weeks after the accident as if nothing had happened.  Executive Assistant Chief Dirden, who is over the Internal Affairs division (“IAD”), admitted in an interview with Channel 13 that none of the officers on the accident scene, including Capt. Manzo, had reported any information from which IAD could open an investigation.  If fact, it was not until Teresa Argueta, the driver of the bus, and Channel 13 started asking questions that any investigation was opened.

We know that Capt. Robert Manzo and a number of the officers on the accident scene were, in fact, aware at the time that there was alcohol in Sgt. Trejo’s truck based on pictures that were taken of the truck and accident scene.

Given the damage to the truck, the lack of visible skid marks on the road, and the distance the bus was thrown by the impact we can conclude that Sgt. Trejo took no evasive actions.  From the statements in Officer Don Egdorf’s Affidavit, we can also conclude that Sgt. Trejo was likely traveling at an high rate of speed.

We also now know that Sgt. Trejo arrived at the hospital with a blood-alcohol content of .205 – nearly three times the legal limit.  We know that Sgt. Trejo was only minutes from climbing behind the wheel of an HPD vehicle where he was to supervise an entire shift.  We know that Sgt. Trejo was not placed under arrest at the time of the accident or at the hospital.  And finally, we know that Capt. Robert Manzo, the supervisor and ranking officer on the accident scene failed in his duty to report any of this to his supervisors.

This is not the first time we have run across Capt. Robert Manzo in the middle of a cover-up.  In a report on the failure of IAD in preventing officer retribution, then Lt. Robert Manzo took an active role in covering up for an officer under his command who participated in the theft of two vehicles and other personal property totaling in excess of $176,000.  None of the property or vehicles was ever recovered.

We grant the men and women of the Houston Police Department the greatest power that can be granted under our constitution: the power to decide and act to take the life of another citizen.  This is arguably the most profound relationship of trust that a society creates, and it exists for good reason.  Police officers must enforce the law against the most unethical of people. They test their resolve, convictions, intelligence and exhibit great courage – to the point of risking their lives – to do so.   A violation of that trust inevitably results in an immediate chilling and disturbing effect on the public.

Each and every decision Capt. Manzo made on April 13th was a violation of the public trust.  His efforts to cover up Trejo’s crimes began as soon as he arrived at the accident scene.  He used his rank and position to direct the actions of the officers under his command to assist with this cover up insuring the omission of particular information in their reports and eventually falsifying his own report.  Manzo had to be aware that Trejo has been named at fault in four accidents in 1990, 1992, 1999 and 2000.  Yet his intention was to cover up this accident thereby insuring that Sgt. Trejo would be back out on the streets of Houston with an unsuspecting public.

Capt. Manzo’s job on the accident scene was to protect the public.  He chose instead to protect his officers facilitating a criminal cover up of Sgt. Trejo’s crimes.  Without any consideration regarding its effect on her livelihood as a bus driver, Teresa Arguete was cited for failure to yield.  Such a citation is an at fault citation shifting the insurance liability for the accident and Sgt. Trejo’s hospital bills and to Teresa Arguete’s policy.

Captain Robert Manzo

Captain Robert Manzo should be charged with official misconduct for his role in attempting to cover up a car accident resulting from driving under the influence of alcohol.  Additionally he should be charged with official misconduct, conspiracy to commit official misconduct, conspiracy to commit insurance fraud and insurance fraud if Teresa Arguete’s insurance policy pays a claim.

The Trejo charges may not stick

When Trejo arrived at the hospital he was not under arrest and thus HPD did not have access to his blood tests.  Texas law only allows warrantless access to blood tests run by the hospital specific to blood alcohol levels if the driver of a vehicle under suspicion of DWI is transported to a hospital from an accident scene and there placed under arrest.   Because Sgt. Trejo was not placed under arrest, all of his medical records are private and require his actual consent before they can be released.

The privacy of the tests run at the hospital on Sgt. Trejo’s blood alcohol level had an additional benefit for Capt. Manzo in that Trejo’s level of intoxication would never show up to contradict Manzo’s version of the accident.  We do not need to read Manzo’s report to know what information he omitted.  We know this by both by Sgt. Trejo returning to work without any charges being filed against him and from Chief Dirden’s admission on April 25, 2007, that none of the officers on the scene reported any information from which IAD could open an investigation.

Only after Teresa Arguete and a local television station continued to ask questions did HPD finally open an investigation.  On April 25th, nearly two weeks after the accident, Sgt. Ruben Trejo was charged with DWI based on the investigation by HPD Officer Don Egdorf.

Officer Egdorf gave an affidavit establishing probable cause to support the charge.  The last paragraph of the Affidavit states that the officer requested a Grand Jury subpoena for Sgt. Trejo’s medical records from the hospital where Trejo was treated after the accident.  Those records apparently included a toxicology report establishing Trejo’s blood alcohol level of .205.  EmPac Texas spoke with a DWI attorney who saw a number of potential problems which could result in the charges against Trejo being dropped.

It is clear from the Affidavit that the sole purpose of the Grand Jury subpoena was to collect medical records for Officer Egdorf’s use in his investigation and not to bring documents before the Grand Jury as part of a grand jury investigation.   It is unlikely that a grand jury was even seated and investigating this matter.  As such the subpoena was improperly issued and represents an abuse of process by Officer Egdorf.

The assistant district attorney that signed the subpoena in this case similarly abused the grand jury subpoena power by issuing the subpoena at the sole request of the investigating officer.  The prosecutor’s power to subpoena can not be used as a tool for police to obtain records that require the consent of the patient.  The Texas Legislature has not chosen to vest police officers with subpoena power, and it would circumvent that legislative judgment to allow the police to make use of the grand jury process in order to do indirectly what they cannot do directly.

Actual consent in a DWI case to obtain a blood sample is not constitutionally required where the accused is under arrest.  But Sgt. Trejo had not been arrested.  Thus access to Trejo’s medical records would seem to require Trejo’s actual consent.

A grand jury subpoena is one of the State’s most powerful tools.  The prosecutor and the investigator stepped outside the scope of their authority in abusing the power of the grand jury subpoena which may result in a ruling of an illegal seizure as it relates to the medical records.  Without those records it is highly unlikely that the charges would stand.

A culture of patterns and practices

In the Chad Holley incident, if the video tape had never emerged, the officers involved – including those that stood by and did not step in to stop the beating, would have never been called to answer for their part in such a heinous violation of individual rights.  The patterns and practices ingrained in the culture of HPD would have shielded them from justice.

It is those same patterns and practices that allowed Sgt. Trejo to return to work as if nothing had happened until a citizen and a member of the media started asking questions.   Nearly twenty officers and a Captain acted to cover up the crimes of a single officer at the expense of protecting the public.

It has become clear that an ingrained culture of oppression is pervasive in the Houston police department.  That culture directly results from the shelter that Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government code provides to officers.  Officers know that under Chapter 143, nearly 70% of disciplinary actions are reversed or reduced making it unlikely that they would ever have to answer for misconduct. Chapter 143 allows Houston’s police officers to violate citizen’s civil rights with impunity comfortable that they will not be held accountable for their actions.

When faced with being forced to reinstate two of the officers he fired for their participation in the Chad Holley incident under the authority of Chapter 143, Chief of Police Charles McClelland underscored the basic denial of civil rights in a statement to the Houston Chronicle.  “How can I protect the public?”

Houston, like dozens of other Texas cities, operates under Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code.  After progressives implemented civil service reforms under Chapter 143 in the 1940s and 1950s, Houston voted to adopt Chapter 143 as a mechanism to protect public servants against machine politics.  While Chapter 143 applies to about 75 Texas cities, Subchapter G of the Act, under which Houston operates, applies only to the City of Houston.

Over the past 30 years, police unions succeeded, one step at a time, in convincing the state legislature to change Chapter 143, reshaping it into a legal device which acts to shield officers from responsibility for their actions.   Chapter 143 enables these pattern and practices by removing potential consequences from an officer that acts to violate a citizen’s civil liberties.

Given the strength of the police unions around the state, it is unlikely that Chapter 143 will ever see legislative correction.  It will take a suit in federal court against the city by a citizen like Chad Holley or Teresa Arguete whose rights have been trampled.  Under either the Equal Protection Clause or the due process clauses, where a law infringes upon a fundamental right, the Court subjects the law to close scrutiny.  The Court presumes that a law that restricts a fundamental right is unconstitutional, and the state may only prove that the law is constitutional by showing that the law is “narrowly tailored” to further a compelling governmental interest. This standard is very difficult for the government to overcome.

Given the Trejo Cover up and the Chad Holley experience, it is doubtful that Chapter 143 would survive the Court’s scrutiny.

The Act was an answer to state and local governments enacting various laws under which African Americans were still being denied the right to vote.  Despite sweeping civil rights legislation on a national level, state and local laws or “devices”, unique to individual communities, were effectively used to lock African Americans out of the voting booth.

On March 23, 2010, in Houston, Texas, a fifteen year-old black teenager was arrested on suspicion of burglary with little notice.  One month later, the Houston Police Department received a tape clearly showing twelve officers beating or not stopping the beating of the teenager we now know as Chad Holley.  The City of Houston, its police department and the Harris County District Attorney fought for nearly a year to keep the tape from the public but in February of this year it was released to a nation shocked and disgusted by its content.

More than just the beating, the Chad Holley video demonstrated a culture ingrained in the police department that a string of black mayors and police chiefs had failed to change.  When the citizens of Houston silently asked themselves whether a fifteen year-old white teenager would have been subjected to such beating by the same officers, most would answer no.  Those few determined to argue otherwise were left with the disturbing view of a police force completely out of control.

When two of the involved officers were reinstated less then a year later under the authority of Texas Local Government Code Chapter 143, it became clear that an ingrained culture of oppression was pervasive in the Houston police department.  That  oppression was enabled through the “device” of narrowly focused state legislation affecting only the City of Houston.  Like the literacy, knowledge or other tests designed by local officials to keep African Americans from voting in 1965, Chapter 143 allows Houston’s police officers to violate civil rights with impunity comfortable that they will not be held accountable for their actions.

Denying Equal Access

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 recognized that despite federal legislation outlawing discrimination, it was possible for state and local governments to enact their own laws or devices which acted to block the exercise of certain civil rights by African Americans.  The Voting Rights Act specifically prohibited the use of any “device” that acted to block any citizen from voting.

The Chad Holley video is another demonstration that minority citizens are the prime victims of police brutality and corruption.  The resulting reinstatement of two of the involved officers pursuant to Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code demonstrates a “device” which denies minority citizens in Houston equal protection.  It denies minority citizens in Houston basic civil rights.

When faced with being forced to reinstate two of the officers he fired for their participation in the Chad Holley incident under the authority of Chapter 143, Chief of Police Charles McClelland underscored the basic denial of civil rights in a statement to the Houston Chronicle.  “How can I protect the public?”

Houston, like dozens of other Texas cities, operates under Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code.  After progressives implemented civil service reforms under Chapter 143 in the 1940s and 1950s, Houston voted to adopt Chapter 143 as a mechanism to protect public servants against machine politics.  While Chapter 143 applies to about 75 Texas cities, Subchapter G of the Act, under which Houston operates, applies only to the City of Houston.

Over the past 30 years, police unions succeeded, one step at a time, in convincing the state legislature to change Chapter 143, reshaping it into a legal device which acts to block minority access to equal protections.   Chapter 143 enables discrimination by removing potential consequences from an officer that acts to violate a citizen’s civil liberties.

At the cross roads of history and fate

Whether by coincidence or fate, history has laid this issue at the doors of Good Hope Ministry Baptist Church.  It is to this congregation that the Honorable Barbara Jordan belonged.  Barbara Jordan was an American hero, eloquent, fearless, and peerless in her pursuit of justice and equality.  She exhorted all of us to strive for excellence, stand fast for justice and fairness, and yield to no one in the matter of defending this Constitution and upholding the most sacred principles of a democratic government.  Chapter 143 epitomizes what would have been a Barbara Jordan’s fight.

Center on history’s stage for this fight is Dr. D. Z. Cofield, Pastor of Good Hope Ministry Baptist Church and President of the Houston Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).   It has fallen to Dr. Cofield to frame this fight and stand fast for justice and fairness.  With the weight of history pressing his actions his task is not an easy one.

Dr. Cofield has called on the city to give the citizens police oversight with subpoena power.  This embodies democratic systems of checks and balances where no one is left to judge him- or herself.  The wide-ranging powers and discretion of law enforcement officers and their vital position as gatekeepers of the criminal justice system make it imperative that members of the public have a means of redress if officers abuse their powers and seek protection from scrutiny behind the so-called blue wall of silence.

Turning to the federal courts for relief

Successive police unions, working with the legislature, have quietly passed state laws which, more often than not, reward Houston police officers who violate our civil rights with job security.  The extent to which state legislation may be allowed to affect the patterns and practices of the Houston Police Department and the conduct of Houston police officers in the absence of Congressional action on the subject is the central question Houston now faces.

Congress has already superseded these laws with regulation of its own which act to restrain the state’s obstructions and encroachments on her citizen’s rights. But when these laws act only upon a single community to the exclusion of all others in the state, the restraints on our liberties these laws effect are individually too petty and too local to get the attention of Congress hard pressed with other more urgent matters.

The practical result is that in default of actions by the citizens of Houston these laws will go on suffocating and retarding the rights of those among us least able to stand on their own.

The Chad Holley video served to demonstrate this fact in a disturbing example of civil rights violations.  The reinstatement of two of the involved officers based on the current construction of Texas Local Government Code Chapter 143 as it applies only to the City of Houston demonstrates state law that fails absolutely to secure the rights of the citizens of Houston.

Our elected officials have quashed free and open debate on these issues citing a higher duty owed to the financial bottom line of the city.  These same officials have refused to institute citizen oversight over Houston’s police department that amounts to anything more than observation.

Chad Holley is effectively locked out of the system and forced to accept the place assigned to him, “an exile in his own land.”  Having once been deprived of his civil rights he is perpetually deprived of equal and fair treatment by law enforcement facing the very real possibility of encountering these same officers, reinstated and relieved of accountability for their actions by state law.

It is time for Chad Holley and all those similarly situated to turn to the federal courts.  Under either the Equal Protection Clause or the due process clauses, where a law infringes upon a fundamental right, the Court subjects the law to close scrutiny.  The Court presumes that a law that restricts a fundamental right is unconstitutional, and the state may only prove that the law is constitutional by showing that the law is “narrowly tailored” to further a compelling governmental interest. This standard is very difficult for the government to overcome.

Given the Chad Holley experience, it is doubtful that Chapter 143 would survive the Courts scrutiny.

It has been almost 2 weeks since last hearing anything about the Chad Holley beating.  It has also been that long since hearing words like subpoena power for an oversight committee, Justice department looking at internal affairs, FBI lending their hand.  You hear none of it and yet do we all need to be reminded that 12 police officers were involved in an incident in which a 15 year boy was beat as indicated by the videotape? Maybe we’re all thinking that it will somehow just go away.  The videotape remains and it clearly shows that these police officers were not a part of some conspiracy but rather a culture ingrained in the department.

Let me assure you that this “lack of information” is not by happen stance.  It is a deliberate attempt by the police department, public officials, and the press to keep information from the public.  The following document shows the scheduling of a press conference for Friday February 25th.  It was well attended by the press, well enough that is was supposed to be a regular live broadcast.

Not only was it not live but it wasn’t on any of the local news for the remainder of that day as a recording.  Nor did the Houston Chronicle cover any part of it.

It’s a sad day for Houston when the media must have their news censored and worse yet, be ok with it.  At best, the press is being biased, not a good trait for any news organization.  At worst, they don’t even cover it.  Kudos to the Mayor’s office for pulling that one off.

Mayor Annise Parker,  you were voted into office on the premise that you were not going to be a part of “the old boy network.”  Don’t let the “old boy network” become a part of you.